09/18/12

The Mid-America Conference on History

     Tomorrow I will be heading over to Springfield to attend the Mid-America Conference on History hosted by Missouri State University. I will be presenting a paper on Thursday at the 3:15 session. I have presented papers to various groups and given interpretive talks for many years, but this will be my first academic conference. Dr. Worth Robert Miller is the conference coordinator this year. Dr. Miller was on my graduate committee  when I was working on my M.A. at Missouri State. It’s been more than four years since I saw him last, and it was a real honor to receive an email from him a few months ago asking if I had a paper I’d like to present this year.

     The paper I will be presenting discusses the personal politics and political party affiliations of Ulysses S. Grant in the years preceding the Civil War. Parts of the paper come from posts on this blog, but the paper represents the research and thought I’ve put into this subject for several years now; particularly the last four years since I’ve been at Ulysses S. Grant NHS. 

     We are all products of the times and the environments in which we are born, grow to maturity, live, and work. Ulysses Grant was no different. Grant biographers have relished the contrast between Grant’s upbringing in Ohio, including his father’s Whig Party and anti-slavery politics, and that of Grant’s years at White Haven, his Democrat, slaveholding, father-in-law’s Missouri plantation, where Grant lived and worked from 1854-1859. My paper explores those two seemingly contradictory influences on  Grant.

     I’m also looking forward to hearing several other presentations, including one by Joan Stack of the State Historical Society of Missouri titled, “The Hat, the Horse, and the Hero: The Impact of Newspaper Illustrations Representing the Civil War Battle of Wilson’s Creek on the Legacy of General Nathaniel Lyon.” Also, the featured speaker on Friday night is Dr. George Rable of the University of Alabama. His talk is titled, “God as General: Was There a Religious History of the American Civil War?” I listened to one of Dr. Rable’s lectures online not long ago in which he said there was an anti-party spirit at the outbreak of the Civil War; regular citizens believed partisan party politicians had brought on the crisis. I note in my paper that Grant displayed that anti-party inclination, despite his quick support of the new Lincoln Administration.

     If you will be attending, or if you are in the area this week, I hope to see you!

04/14/12

There’s Always Something New to Learn In History

Mission San Luis Obispo de Telosa

     There are many famous Americans of the 19th century. I’ve been studying the time period for many years and therefore I know much about the lives of several of them. But, it takes time and a lot of effort to truly delve into the lives of particular individuals. Even then, I can never truly know everything about the person. There are many people whose names I know, and perhaps I have encountered them in various narratives, but I only know of them in a particular time and place. When I happen to learn something new about them it is sometimes quite surprising; especially when the information is found in a place I wasn’t expecting. That is what happened today.

If you’ve been reading this blog, you know I worked for several years giving tours of San Luis Obispo, California. I took people to the Mission and told some of the history of the city. After moving to Missouri, I eventually worked at Wilson’s Creek National Battlefield, and wrote my graduate paper on the battle. Today I found a connection between San Luis Obispo and the Battle of Wilson’s Creek in an unusual place.

I was at work at Grant NHS and the site curator had an auction catalogue. I was looking through it and a letter that is currently up for bid caught my eye. This is the catalogue description:

  Union General Samuel Sturgis handwritten letter signed, dated 10 March 1886, on Ebbitt Hotel, Washington, D.C. stationery. He replies to Mary C. Day’s request for an autograph. After his graduation from West Point in 1846, Sturgis saw service in the Mexican-American War and at its conclusion, took part in Indian campaigns in the West. He writes to Day of his experiences in California. Letter reads in part, ”…I hasten to enclose my autograph in compliance with your request. You will be surprised perhaps to learn that I was what was called a ’49er, and it was at San Louis Obispo, that in the spring of 1849, I prepared and fitted out my small Company of Dragoons for an expedition against the Indians in the neighborhood of the Tulare lakes & the head of Kings River. In those days San Louis Obispo was simply an old Mission, but is probably now a thriving town. The world has changed so much since those days…” He signs, ”S.D. Sturgis”.

 

Samuel D. SturgisIf you don’t recognize Sturgis’ name you can see here. He was a Major at the outbreak of the Civil War. It was Sturgis who took command of the Federal troops who were holding out on Bloody Hill at the Battle of Wilson’s Creek when Nathaniel Lyon was killed. I had no idea that Sturgis had ever been in San Luis Obispo.

Sometimes it is these surprising little tidbits of information that make history so interesting. And, don’t you just love that last line, “The world has changed so much since those days…” Makes me wonder what he would think if he could see the world today.

09/9/11

Christopher Phillips Strikes Again – and this time it’s not Lyon

From "Captain Sam Grant" by Lloyd Lewis

     Apparently Christopher Phillips isn’t satisfied with attacking the first, but lesser known, Union hero, Nathaniel Lyon; he’s now going after bigger fish. His newest contribution to the New York Times Disunion series is an assault on the Union’s biggest and most well-known hero, Ulysses S. Grant. Why the Times chose Phillips for an article on Grant is a mystery when there are scholars much more qualified who could have been called upon (Hello, Brooks Simpson). I asked Brooks if he could post a review of Phillips’ article, but he answered that he doesn’t have the time, so this post will point out just a bit of what I see as problematic in the article in regards to Grant before the war. Anyone who has read this blog knows I disagree with much of what Phillips has written about Lyon, and I believe Phillips’ “revisionist” interpretation of the Civil War colors his views on Union heroes. See here, here, and here. So it is perhaps not surprising that I would take exception to his caricature of Grant. So here goes.

     First, it is a stretch at best to say that “Little Egypt” was ever Grant’s home, as one commenter on the NYT blog pointed out. Cairo, Illinois is almost four hundred miles from Georgetown, Ohio where Grant spent his boyhood years.  As Phillips acknowledges, the areas where Grant grew up and was educated were “hotbeds of abolitionism,” a description that could never be applied to “Little Egypt.” Ohio does not even share a border with Illinois and Grant never lived in Indiana. The closest Grant came to living in “Little Egypt” would have been his years in St. Louis where the politics of slavery were complex and increasingly contentious as I have discussed in several blogposts. If he wanted to write about a Union hero who was actually from “Little Egypt,” I might suggest John A. Logan.

     Phillips describes Grant’s father Jesse as “mildly anti-slavery.” While I would not say Jesse Grant was a William Lloyd Garrison or a Theodore Weld, he was pretty firm in his convictions. He wrote anti-slavery pieces for the local paper and he was more than a bit piqued when his son married into a “tribe of slaveholders” as he labeled the Dents. Then Phillips writes this:

“After graduating from West Point, Grant married the daughter of an affluent Missouri slaveholder and, after an undistinguished and often drunken army career, left to farm unsuccessfully on a rocky piece of Missouri timber that his father-in-law gave him. (Appropriately, Grant named it “Hardscrabble.”)”

First, Phillips completely skips over the fact that Grant was twice brevetted for bravery, which meant an honorary promotion to Captain, during the Mexican War. This begs the question, what would Phillips consider distinguished?  And then there is the “often drunken” charge. How does Phillips define “often”? When specifically is Phillips referring to here? During the Mexican War? While Grant was stationed in Detroit or New York? While he was making the difficult crossing of the Isthmus of Panama? Perhaps during Grant’s stay at Vancouver Barracks or his brief time at Ft. Humboldt? The charges of Grant’s alleged problem with alcohol have been, and will continue to be, debated among historians. I think there is little doubt that Grant drank on occasion while stationed on the west coast, but Phillips makes his statement as if it’s a proven fact that Grant drank all the time. This is a slanderous charge that should be better explained or at least qualified.  Then there is the disparagement of Grant’s efforts to make a living as a farmer back in Missouri.

     The name “Hardscrabble” had nothing to do with the soil or the farm itself; it was the appellation the Grants gave to the log house Grant built. It is an example of Grant’s wonderful sense of humor. As Julia wrote in her Memoirs, “The little house looked so unattractive that we facetiously decided to call it Hardscrabble.” And, Phillips’ assertion of Grant’s “poor head for business and ineptitude at farming” shows that Phillips knows little about Grant’s experience at White Haven. Grant’s biggest challenge was a lack of capital. Despite Phillips’ description of Julia’s father as an “affluent Missouri slaveholder,” Colonel Dent’s fortunes, by the time Grant arrived to farm in 1854, were already in decline. Like many plantation and farm owners, he was land (and slave) rich and cash poor. Grant tried to borrow money from his own father, but Jesse Grant was not happy Grant was involved with slaveholders and generally refused to help. Grant ran into three major obstacles in his quest to be a successful farmer. First, there was a “panic” or recession as we would call it today, in 1857, which caused farm prices to plunge. Second, Grant, his family, and the White Haven slaves were struck with a serious illness, likely malaria. Third, what really ended the farming operations, in June of 1858, a deep freeze killed farmers’ crops all around the St. Louis region. Given his lack of capital, this was a blow Grant could not overcome. None of these factors have anything to do with Grant’s ability to grow crops, which as near as we can tell, he was quite capable of doing. Furthermore, it should be noted that despite Grant’s struggles to support his family during these years, he was quite happy; he was back with his wife and children.

     This brings us to the issue of Grant and slaves. Phillips says:

 “Grant was even more ambivalent about slavery than his father — enough to free the only slave he ever owned (given to him by his wife’s father), but he was not sufficiently opposed to it to deter him from hiring slave field hands or sell his wife’s domestic servants.

How does freeing a slave that would fetch $1000-1500 (a substantial sum then) at a time when he desperately needed money to support his young family show ambivalence? And as I discussed in this earlier post, there is no evidence that Grant ever hired slave field hands. McFeely, from whom Phillips likely got this information, botched his handling of Grant’s letters upon which this is based. It is far more likely that Grant hired “free men of color.” Furthermore, Grant never sold any slaves ever! And, as I discussed in this earlier post, Julia never actually owned any slaves. Phillips goes on to say that Grant’s “ambivalence to slavery” did not “drive him from the Democratic Party, or even from the slave states.” Phillips, who has written books about Missouri politics should know that the Democratic Party dominated antebellum Missouri, but was often split into opposing factions. By the time Grant arrived in 1854, the Whig Party had begun to disintegrate and there was no Republican Party. Grant actually flirted with the Know-Nothing Party at one point, so he could not have been too dedicated to the Democrats. As I have said before, there were some who believed the Democratic Party would become the anti-slavery party. So what exactly does Grant’s association with Democrats really say about his views on slavery? See these previous posts (here and here) for more on this. The only slave state he ever lived in was Missouri and he had good reason for being there; he wanted to be with his family.

     I have to ask, what point is Phillips trying to make in describing Grant’s views on slavery before the war? That the war wasn’t really about slavery? That Grant didn’t really believe it was about slavery? As Brooks Simpson has pointed out before, what Grant thought about slavery tells us little about the cause of the war because he was not involved in the secession process on either side. But, we really don’t have to guess regarding what Grant thought. In 1861 he wrote explicit letters detailing his understanding of the cause, which I have written about before. These letters show a very insightful analysis and understanding of the politics of the day, which disproves Phillips’ most egregious assertion, that Grant was “largely politically uninformed.” That is just ludicrous.

I could go on with this post, but I think I will end here. It seems to me that Phillips took most of his article from McFeely’s biography which, in my humble opinion, is not the best source for understanding Ulysses S. Grant. He cites Simpson’s “Let Us  Have Peace,” but as Brooks said on his blog, his biography of Grant, “Triumph over Adversity,” would have been a much better source for this article. He also cites Joan Waugh’s book, but I can’t see much in this article that would reflect Waugh’s interpretation of Grant.

 

08/11/11

Who Really Won the Battle of Wilson’s Creek?

Excerpted and edited from my 2008 MA paper: 

    By all accounts, the Battle of Wilson’s Creek was a furious engagement in which citizen soldiers stood shoulder to shoulder, faced each other at close range, and fired deadly volleys of lead into each other. The fight for Bloody Hill, the focal point of the battle, raged for more than five hours. Despite repeated attempts by the secessionist forces to dislodge the Union Army from the hill, Union lines could not be broken.  Neither side could gain an advantage, but ammunition was running low. Following the death of Lyon, Major Samuel Sturgis assumed command, and under his orders during a lull in the fighting, the Federals retreated to Springfield, leaving the enemy in control of the field, but unable or unwilling to follow in pursuit. At Springfield, Sturgis relinquished command to Colonel Franz Sigel, who outranked him, and under Sigel’s orders the Union Army further retreated to Rolla. The Union retreat allowed the Confederates to occupy Springfield unopposed the next day. 

   Sturgis’ official post-battle report dated August 20, 1861, gave no indication of how he perceived the significance of the outcome. He praised the gallantry of his men, and claimed they retreated due to a lack of ammunition and water, believing they still faced an enemy that numbered 20,000 men to their less than 4,000.[1] Other Union officers offered similar assessments, praising their men and each other. Captain Frederick Steele stated:

I commanded the rear guard on the retreat towards Springfield, but saw nothing of the enemy; it was evident that he had been severely punished.[2]

Second Lieutenant John V. Dubois reported:

We were not followed by the enemy, who had, I think, been driven from the field.[3]

The only dire note of concern was sounded by Sigel. In his report of August 12, 1861, Sigel wrote:

Once in possession of Springfield, the enemy will be able to raise the southwest of the State against us, add a great number of men to his army, make Springfield a great depot, and continue his operations towards Rolla, and probably also towards the Missouri River (Jefferson City).[4]  

 On the secessionist side, Missouri State Guard commander, Sterling Price claimed:

The brilliant victory thus achieved upon this hard-fought field was won only by the most determined bravery and distinguished gallantry of the combined armies, which fought nobly side-by-side in defense of their common rights and liberties with as much courage and constancy as were ever exhibited upon any battle-field.[5]

Confederate General Benjamin McCulloch also claimed “a great victory over the enemy.”[6] Captain James McIntosh wrote to his troops:

The general commanding takes great pleasure in announcing to the army under his command the signal victory it has just gained. Soldiers of Louisiana, of Arkansas, of Missouri, and of Texas, nobly have you sustained yourselves! Shoulder to shoulder you have met the enemy and driven him before you…The opposing force, composed mostly of the old Regular Army of the North, have thrown themselves upon you, confident of victory, but by great gallantry and determined courage you have entirely routed it with great slaughter.[7]

     On August 28, 1861, the Confederate War Department sent McCulloch a congratulatory letter in which it stated the battle would “be mentioned in accents of gratitude not only in Missouri, probably liberated by your arms, but throughout the entire Confederacy…”[8] In the North, on December 24, 1861, the United States Congress passed a joint resolution thanking Lyon and his Army for their “victory against overwhelming numbers,” and, in “recognition of the eminent and patriotic services of the late Brigadier-General Nathaniel Lyon,” Congress promised: “The country to whose service he devoted his life will guard and preserve his fame as a part of its own glory.”[9]

     In the days after the battle most Northern newspapers declared a Union victory at Wilson’s Creek, while Southern newspapers boasted of a Confederate victory. “The victory of the Union force under General Lyon was brilliant and overwhelming,” gushed the Topeka Kansas State Record.[10] “Never has a greater victory crowned the efforts of the friends of Liberty and Equal Rights,” boasted Colonel John Hughes of the Missouri State Guard in the Liberty [Missouri] Tribune.[11]

     As early as 1863, Northerners published monographs declaring Wilson’s Creek a victory – or at least something close to a victory. Typical is the following, written by John S. C. Abbott in 1863:

Thus ended the Battle of Wilson’s Creek. In its results it may surely be counted as a victory, for it secured the safety of the army which thus could be attained. The enemy was thwarted entirely in his plans, and his baggage-train was fired and destroyed. The foe, admonished by the terrific blows they had received, did not venture to interfere with the retirement of the Unionists.[12]

The fact that the Union Army was able to retreat unmolested was, and would be, frequently cited as proof of a Union victory. 

     The focus on the issue of who won the battle in these wartime accounts is understandable. Success on the battlefield often meant stronger popular political support at home for each cause. Furthermore, as some studies have shown, issues of personal and community honor were at stake, particularly in the first year of the war.[13]

     In the years after the war, as Americans struggled to reconcile, interpretations of the war’s meaning had profound impacts on the shape of post-war society and political power. In Missouri, Radicals clashed with Conservatives over the civil and political rights of both former rebels and African-Americans.[14] Consciously or unconsciously, accounts of the battle of Wilson’s Creek written during these years contributed to this struggle over the memory and meaning of the war.

     In 1883 one of the first comprehensive published accounts of the Battle of Wilson’s Creek appeared.[15] Authorship of the slim volume was ascribed to Return Holcombe and W. S. Adams, though historians believe the manuscript was largely the work of Holcombe.[16] Holcombe clearly portrayed Wilson’s Creek as a Confederate victory, despite the fact that Price and McCulloch did not pursue the retreating Federals. He wrote:

     The news of the battle of Wilson’s Creek was received with great joy throughout the Southern Confederacy and everywhere that the Confederate cause had sympathizers, and the event did much for that cause in Missouri, by stimulating recruiting and causing many an undecided individual to come down off the fence and stand on the Southern side.”[17]

     The Holcombe and Adams account of the Battle of Wilson’s Creek was followed in 1886 by the publication of a book that had far reaching influence on the historic interpretation of the battle. Written by Thomas L. Snead, The Fight For Missouri: From the Election of Lincoln to the Death of Lyon, may be the first published narrative which proclaimed that Wilson’s Creek was the battle that saved Missouri for the Union, though not in those exact words.[18] Snead’s description of Lyon influenced public perceptions of the Union hero well into the twentieth century. The book, however, was not without controversy. Although the book was praised by some Union and Confederate veterans as “non-partisan,” “comprehensive,” “impartial,” and “fair,” many other former Confederates considered it to be too generous in its treatment of the Union opposition.  Also critical, though from the opposite perspective, the national Union veterans association, the Grand Army of the Republic, “attempted to have Snead’s writings removed from the public schools because they did not think that he was impartial.”[19]  

     Snead had been intimately involved with the Confederate war effort. Trained as a lawyer in Virginia, he had moved to St. Louisin 1851. A slave owner and a Democrat, Snead became editor of the St. Louis Bulletin, and became active in Missouri’s political affairs, earnestly supporting states’ rights and the pro-slavery wing of the Democratic Party. As events in Missouri became increasingly tense in early 1861 following the election of Lincoln, Snead moved to Jefferson City, where Governor Claiborne Fox Jackson commissioned him as his military aide.[20] Jackson was also a large plantation and slave owner, and had strong Southern sympathies.

     Jackson and Snead worked hand in hand to effect the secession of Missourifrom the Union. Snead was present at the Planters’ House meeting on June 11, 1861. Snead thereafter accompanied Governor Jackson, as Lyon and his Federal army chased the elected state government from the capitol at Jefferson City. He was with Jackson at the battles of Booneville and Carthage, and when Jackson relinquished his command of the state militia to General Price, Snead accepted the post of chief of ordnance under Price.[21] This meant that he was present at the Battle of Wilson’s Creek.

     Snead came to be a great admirer and champion of Price, and to detest McCulloch, whom he felt had squandered opportunities in Missouri by not cooperating with Price, and because McCulloch had shown such disdain for the valor of Missourians. As for Lyon, Snead wrote that he “had not fought and died in vain.”[22] Snead believed Lyon’s actions since he had arrived in Missouri until his death at Wilson’s Creek, gave the Unionists the time needed to take control of the state’s government and resources, which were “used to sustain the Union and crush the South.”[23]  He concluded:

All this had been done while Lyon was boldly confronting the overwhelming strength of Price and McCulloch.  Had he abandoned Springfield instead, and opened to Price a pathway to the Missouri; had he not been willing to die for the freedom of the negro, and for the preservation of the Union, none of these things would have been done. By wisely planning, by boldly doing, and by bravely dying, he had won the fight for Missouri.[24] 

     Snead’s praise would almost certainly ring true, were it not for the uncomfortable facts that Wilson’s Creek was not a clear cut victory for the Union Army and the Federals did abandon Springfield, albeit after the battle. Nevertheless, promoters of the idea of a federal military park at the site of the battle would use Snead’s “unbiased” testimony to accord Wilson’s Creek a historic significance that some historians deny. In addition, beginning in 1982, Snead’s words would be used prominently in the interpretive film shown to thousands of visitors to Wilson’s Creek National Battlefield.  Interestingly, in 1897, a report from the Committee on Military Affairs to Congress used the interpretation that the battle had saved Missouri for the Union to justify the detail of Army units to participate in the Wilson’s Creek reunion that year. Whether or not the committee was influenced by Snead’s interpretation is unknown, but it definitively stated:

So stubbornly did he [Lyon] and his devoted command contest the ground fought over that the victors were unable to pursue their advantage, and it is truthfully said that the result of the battle was to save the great State of Missouri to the Union.[25]

     In November 1884, Century magazine began publishing the most renowned series of soldier’s recollections of the war, and in 1888, issued a four volume collection of these articles titled Battles and Leaders of the Civil War.[26] In his article, William Wherry, Lyon’s aide-de-camp, praised the “unabated ardor and impetuosity [of] the Confederates.”[27] Pearce, who had commanded the Arkansas troops, wrote that upon their arrival at the crest of Bloody Hill and discovering the Federals had retreated:

We watched the retreating enemy through our field glasses, and were glad to see them go.[28]

Nevertheless, both continued to disagree over which side actually won. Wherry wrote:

Our troops continued to send a galling fire into the disorganized masses as they fled, until they disappeared, and the battle was ended.[29]

Pearce wrote:

At about this time (11:30 A.M.) the first line of battle before us gave way. Our boys charged the second line with a yell, and were soon in possession of the field, the enemy slowly withdrawing toward Springfield. This hour decided the contest and won for us the day. It was in our front here, as was afterward made known, that the brave commander of the Federal forces, General Lyon, was killed, gallantly leading his men to what he and they supposed was victory, but which proved (it may be because they were deprived of his enthusiastic leadership) disastrous defeat.[30]

 Note the praise for Lyon.

     None of the accounts published in Battles and Leaders, not even one contributed by Snead, claimed that Wilson’s Creek saved Missouri for the Union.

     Two more published accounts of the battle appeared during the reunion years. Both written by Union veterans, they are, as might be expected, partisan in nature. In 1890, Wiley Britton authored The Civil War on the Border: Volume I, 1861-1862.[31] Britton explained Price and McCulloch’s failure to pursue the retreating Federal army after the battle at Wilson’s Creek thus: “The combined Southern forces were really defeated on the field, and were not at all anxious to renew the conflict.”[32] Yet, at a later point in his narrative, Britton stated that the Union army was defeated at Wilson’s Creek. As a result of the defeat, there were no Federal troops in western Missouri, leaving the way free for Confederate forces to occupy that portion of the state and greatly increase recruitment.  McCulloch, however, refused to take advantage of the situation and cooperate with Price in his venture north to Lexington.[33] 

     John McElroy, in The Struggle for Missouri, published in 1909, generally agreed with Britton’s interpretation of Wilson’s Creek.[34] “Dedicated to the Union Men of Missouri,” his narrative was indicative of the difficulty in explaining the results of the battle without fully admitting a Confederate victory, but may be an accurate description nonetheless:

     The moral effect of the battle was prodigious on both sides. The Union troops were    conscious of having met overwhelming forces and fought them to a stand-still, if not actual defeat.  Every man felt himself a victor as he left the field, and only retreated because the exigencies of the situation rendered that the most politic move.[35]

    It was consequently a great encouragement to the Union sentiment everywhere, and did much to retrieve the humiliation of Bull Run.  The Confederates naturally made the most of the fact that they had been left masters of the field, and they dilated extensively upon the killing of Gen. Lyon and the crushing defeat they had administered upon Sigel, with capture of prisoners, guns, and flags. They used this to so good purpose as to greatly stimulate the secession spirit throughout the State.[36]

     Significantly, McElroy’s narrative concluded, not with the Battle of Wilson’s Creek, but with the Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas in March of 1862. He wrote of Pea Ridge: “At the conclusion of the battle Missouri was as firmly anchored to the Union as her neighbors, Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas.”[37]

 


     [1]  U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 3 (1881; repr.Harrisburg,PA: Historical Times, Inc.,1985), 69. 

     [2] Ibid., 79.

     [3] Ibid., 80.

     [4] Ibid., 85.

     [5] Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 3, 100.

     [6] Ibid., 107.

     [7] Ibid., 108.

     [8] Ibid., 130.

     [9] Ibid., 93.

     [10] Quoted in William Garrett Piston and Richard W. Hatcher III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 319.

     [11] Ibid. 

     [12] John S. C. Abbott, The History of the Civil War in America; Comprising a Full and Impartial Account of the Progress of the Rebellion, of the Various Naval and Military Engagements, of the Heroic Deeds Performed by Armies and Individuals, of the Touching Scenes in the Field, the Camp, the Hospital, and the Cabin, Volume I (Chicago, Illinois: O.F. Gibbs, 1863), 274.

     [13] Regarding the role of courage and honor in soldier’s motivations in the Civil War in general, see Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1987). Regarding the role of courage and honor in soldier’s motivations at Wilson’s Creek, see Piston and Hatcher, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It.

     [14] William E. Parrish, A History of Missouri: Volume III 1860-1875  (Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 116-169.

     [15] Return I. Holcombe and W.S. Adams, An Account of the Battle of Wilson’s Creek or Oak Hills (1883; repr.,Springfield,Missouri: Greene County Historical Society Independent Printing Co, 1998).

     [16] Ibid., ii-iii.

     [17] Holcombe and Adams, An Account of the Battle of Wilson’s Creek or Oak Hills, 74.

     [18] Thomas L. Snead, The Fight For Missouri: From the Election of Lincoln to the Death of Lyon (1886; repr.,Independence,Missouri: Two Trails Publishing, 1997).

     [19] Robert E. Miller, “Proud Confederate: Thomas Lowndes Snead of Missouri,” Missouri Historical Review, Volume 79, No. 2 (1985), 188-189.

     [20] Ibid., 171.

     [21] Miller, “Proud Confederate,” 174.

     [22] Snead, The Fight For Missouri, 302.

     [23] Ibid., 302-303.

     [24] Ibid., 303.

     [25] House Committee on Military Affairs, Wilson Creek Reunion, Springfield, MO. 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 1897, H. Rep. 2870.

     [26] Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (1888;  repr., New York: Thomas Yoseloff, Inc., 1956).

     [27] William Wherry, “Wilson’s Creek, and the Death of Lyon,” in Battles and Leaders Vol. I, 296.

     [28] N.B. Pearce, “Arkansas Troops in the Battle of Wilson’s Creek,” in Battles and Leaders Vol. I, 303.

     [29] Wherry, “Wilson’s Creek, and the Death of Lyon,” in Battles and Leaders Vol. I, 297.

     [30] Pearce, “Arkansas Troops in the Battle of Wilson’s Creek,” in Battles and Leaders Vol. I, 303.

     [31] Wiley Britton, The Civil War on the Border: Volume I, 1861-1862 (1899; repr.,Ottawa,Kansas: Kansas Heritage Press, 1994).

     [32] Ibid., 109.

     [33] Ibid., 121.

     [34] John McElroy, The Struggle for Missouri (WashingtonD.C.: The National Tribune Co., 1909).

     [35] McElroy’s declaration that “every man” fighting for theUnion“felt himself a victor” may have been a bit of an exaggeration.  It seems unlikely Sigel’s troops, who had been scattered and driven from the field by McCulloch’s Louisianans, felt victorious.

    [36] McElroy, The Struggle for Missouri, 180.

     [37] Ibid., 342.

 

08/10/11

The Death of Lyon

150 years ago today, a fiery, red-headed, career Army officer laid down his life in the service of his country on a blood-stained hillside in southwest Missouri. The Battle of Wilson’s Creek had already raged for several hours when the fateful bullet struck Nathaniel Lyon. From Jeff Patrick’s new book:

“About 9:30 a.m., the confusion of battle created a gap in the Federal line. Lyon ordered Col. Robert B. Mitchell’s Second Kansas into the gap and then rode beside Mitchell as his unit marched in that direction, no doubt to show Mitchell where to place his regiment. But the Federals were, in the words of one Kansan, ‘unaware of the close proximity of the enemy.’ As Lyon turned to his right to watch the Kansans wheel into line, disaster struck. ‘All at once from the trees and bushes came a murderous volley, the head of the column being but a few yards from the ambushed [sic] rebels. Gen. Lyon and Col. Mitchell were conspicuous marks.’ Shots tore into the mounted officers and the leading companies of the Second Kansas. A rifle bullet entered Lyon’s left side, plowed through his heart and both lungs, and exited the opposite side. The federal commander was dead almost immediately.” 

Nathaniel Lyon was the first Union officer to die in battle in the Civil War. In the immediate aftermath of the battle, Lyon was hailed as a martyr to the Union cause, and a national hero. His body was taken by train back to his home state of Connecticut for burial and the excursion was somewhat of a precursor to that of Abraham Lincoln’s just a few years later. Southerners claimed a victory at Wilson’s Creek, making the most of the fact that they held the field at the battle’s conclusion and that they had killed Lyon. Northerners however, felt they had more than held their own, had only reluctantly retreated due to a lack of ammunition and water on that blisteringly hot August day, and had dealt a stunning blow to the secessionists. 

On December 30, 1861, Congress passed a joint resolution in which it said:

“That Congress deems it just and proper to enter upon its records a recognition of the eminent and patriotic services of the late Nathaniel Lyon. The country to whose service he devoted his life will guard and preserve his fame as a part of its own glory.

That the thanks of Congress are hereby given to the brave officers and men who, under the command of the late Gen. Lyon, sustained the honor of the flag, and achieved a victory against overwhelming odds at the battle of Springfield, [Wilson's Creek] in Missouri…”

 

This is the sculpture moved from the site of Camp Jackson.

For many years it was recognized that Lyon’s “gallant and patriotic services” had secured the critically important city of St. Louis and the state of Missouri for the Union. It might not be much of an exaggeration to say that if St. Louis and Missouri had been lost to the Confederacy the results of the war would have been completely different.  After the war, St. Louisans also determined to honor Lyon. They acquired property that had belonged to the federal arsenal and dedicated a public park to Lyon, including a granite obelisk. In 1929, a sculpture dedicated to Lyon and the Union troops at Camp Jackson was placed at the site of Camp Jackson. In 1960, Harriet Frost Fordyce, the daughter of Daniel Frost, the pro-secession commander of Camp Jackson who had surrendered to Lyon, donated a million dollars to St. Louis University to purchase the property with the caveat that the Lyon sculpture would be removed to Lyon Park.  

In my Master’s paper, which I have posted excerpts of here and here, I was critical of the National Park Service’s interpretions of Lyon at Wilson’s Creek National Battlefield in recent years. I wrote that “one is hard pressed to see how Lyon’s fame is guarded and preserved as Congress promised it would be so many years ago.” But, at least the battlefield itself is being maintained and preserved.  The neglect of Lyon Park by the City of St. Louis is downright shameful as can be seen in these photos taken just this morning. Presumably, this is due to budget issues, but I think if the City can’t do better than this then maybe the property should be returned to the federal government to be maintained by the Park Service…oh, wait, the federal government doesn’t have any money either.

 

06/11/11

Christopher Phillips Strikes Again

     I no sooner posted about the Planters House meeting when I noticed Christopher Phillips’ contribution to the New York Times Disunion series. See here. If you have been reading this blog, you know I don’t agree with much of what Phillips says and, in particular, I disagree with his interpretation of Nathaniel Lyon. If you haven’t read my earlier posts see here, here, and here.

And, by the way, Thomas Hart Benton died in 1858, so it would have been very difficult for him to run for governor against Claib Jackson in 1860 as Phillips seems to imply. Perhaps he is referring to Benton losing his Senate seat as a result of the clash between the pro-slavery faction led by Jackson in Missouri and Benton who argued against slavery expansion into the territories. Jackson, however, did not take Benton’s seat in the Senate.

06/11/11

The Fateful Meeting

     June 11, 1861. Planters House Hotel, St. Louis, Missouri. 150 years ago today, Claiborne Fox Jackson, Sterling Price, Nathaniel Lyon, and Frank Blair met to discuss the precarious situation in the state of Missouri. The above image is from John McElroy’s 1909 book, The Struggle For Missouri. I was going to include some of McElroy’s text on the Planter’s House meeting , but instead I will direct you to this website where it is already provided. 

     I’ve read a number of historians’ descriptions of this meeting. It is difficult to imagine how the two sides could have come to a workable agreement. Jackson and Price wanted Missouri to join the other slave states in secession. Lyon and Blair were not going to let that happen. Jackson and Price claimed to want peace and neutrality for Missouri, but their prior actions belied their assurances that they would protect loyal citizens and keep Missouri neutral. As McElroy wrote, Jackson “entered the conference full of his official importance as the head of the great Sovereign State, braving the whole United States…” Lyon saw right through him. Lyon understood what President Lincoln understood; that the national government could not survive if the individual state governments could dictate what the national government could or could not do.

     The absolute worst interpretation of this meeting is found in Christopher Phillips’ Damned Yankee. Not because Phillips fails to explain Lyon’s careful and reasonable arguments, but because Phillips inserts his psychological attacks on Lyon again. Phillips:

“Though he couched his objections to Jackson’s proposals in terms of federal authority, in truth Lyon now refused to accept any restriction of his own omnipotence. Once he had no power. Now Lyon was the power. His duty was not- and never had been – to make peace with the secessionists. His duty, his calling, was to punish them. No one else knew how. And now, no one could stop him. God was in him.”

In Truth? Whose truth? What utter poppycock! There is not a shred of evidence to support this description of Lyon’s state of mind or his motivations. How can there be? Could Phillips actually read Lyon’s mind more than a hundred years after he died?

Thomas L. Snead, who was present at the meeting as an aid to Jackson, had this to say about Lyon:

“In half an hour it was he that was conducting it [the meeting], holding his own at every point against Jackson and Price, masters though they were of Missouri politics whose course they had been directing and controlling for years while he was only captain of an infantry regiment on the Plains. He had not, however, been a mere soldier in those days, but had been an earnest student of the very questions that he was now discussing, and he comprehended the matter as well as any man, and handled it in the soldierly way to which he had been bred, using the sword to cut the knots that he could not untie.”

Snead, who fought with Price and the Confederacy throughout the war, said nothing about any “God-complex” in Lyon. On the contrary, his words indicate a deep respect for Lyon.

05/12/11

Adam Arenson’s New York Times Article

     There have been some outstanding articles in the Disunion series the New York Times is running on the Civil War.  Unfortunately, today’s offering on St. Louis by Adam Arenson falls short. Adam Arenson is an assistant professor of history at the University of Texas at El Paso and the author of a new book “The Great Heart of the Republic: St. Louis and the Cultural Civil War.” Arenson recently was a guest speaker at Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. I was working that day, so I was unable to attend, but I was told he gave an excellent talk. I am planning to read his book, but I hope this article is not an indication of what to expect.

     Arenson begins the article with this assertion:

     “But in the second week of May 1861, St. Louisans could imagine what the end of the Civil War might bring as well: after a bloody skirmish between Confederate sympathizers and federal troops in St. Louis, city leaders sought to instill a new order, one that would maintain the property rights of Confederate sympathizers while guaranteeing Union control of the city. Some called it victory; some called it occupation. With the perspective of 150 years, we might call it the beginnings of Reconstruction.”

     An explanation of this would have made an interesting article. Who were these “city leaders” to whom he refers? What exactly is this “new order”?  And, I think he is referring to the war years here, but if so, he skips over the period of the Price-Harney agreement, which kept an uneasy peace until after Jackson and Lyon met at the Planter’s House in June. At any rate, none of this is explained because he backtracks to talk about Camp Jackson.

      There are several factual errors in the article. The arsenal seized on April 20 was at Liberty, Mo, not Lexington. Lyon was a captain at the time of the Camp Jackson affair, not a general. Lyon was kicked by his horse before the riot even began. Grant went to the St. Louis arsenal before the Camp Jackson seizure and riot, not after.*** It was Lyon who said “this means war,” not Jackson. The state offices were declared vacated and the provisional government was established before Jackson’s rump legislature passed the secession ordinance, not the other way around as this article seems to imply.

     Furthermore, sometimes brevity leaves too much unsaid, as in the one sentence regarding Fremont, Lincoln and emancipation. I intend to write more about that in future blogs.

***NOTE*** Grant said in his Memoirs: “I had seen the troops start out in the morning and had wished them success. I now determined [after the seizure] to go to the arsenal and await their arrival and congratulate them….The next day I left St. Louis…”  (Vol. 1, pg. 236-238) Also see this earlier post.

05/5/11

Ulysses Grant On Camp Jackson

     By May of 1861, Missouri, and St. Louis in particular, was a boiling cauldron of political, ethnic, religious, class, and racial tensions. Violence had been endemic for years, especially on the western border. If there is one incident that historians point to, however, as the spark that started the Civil War in Missouri, the Ft. Sumter of the West if you will, it would be Camp Jackson. Much ink has been spilled over the years in arguing whether or not the camp was a threat to the United States government,  just how pro-secession its militia actually was, whether or not its capture was Constitutional, etc., etc. It is also often said that Nathaniel Lyon decided to act almost completely on his own authority, and therefore, as his biographer Christopher Phillips alleges, Lyon alone was responsible for starting the Civil War in Missouri. I heard a lot of this line of interpretation at the Camp Jackson re-enactment this past weekend. It is interesting, though, that these interpretations of Camp Jackson date all the way back to the actual event in 1861. Ulysses Grant had obviously heard them all by the time he had this conversation with John Russell Young during his trip around the world. Here is what he had to say on the subject:

     “We owe the safety of St. Louis to Frank Blair and General Lyon – mainly to Blair. That one service alone entitles Blair’s memory to the lasting respect of all Union men. The rebels, under pretext of having a camp of instruction, sent their military regiments into a camp and called it Camp Jackson. The governor did it, as was his right. But the governor was in sympathy with the rebellion, and he had never done such a thing before. The purpose, of course, was evident. Under pretext of a militia camp, he would quietly accumulate a large force, and suddenly proclaim the Confederacy. At this very time the rebel flag was hanging out from recruiting stations, and companies were enrolled for the South. The best families, the best young men in the city, leaned that way. There were, no doubt, many Union men in the ranks of Camp Jackson; but when the time came they would have been taken into the rebellion at the point of a bayonet, just as so many of their brethren were carried in East Tennessee. It was necessary to strike a decisive blow, and this Blair resolved to do. There were some regular troops there under the command of Lyon. Blair called out his German regiments, put himself under the command of Lyon, went out to the camp, threatened to fire if it did not surrender, and brought the whole crowd in as prisoners. That was the end of all rebel camps in St. Louis, and next day the rebel flags all came down.”

     “I happened to be in St. Louis,” said the General, “as a mustering officer of an Illinois regiment at the time. I remember the effect it produced. I was anxious about this camp, and the morning of the movement I went up to the arsenal. I knew Lyon; but, although I had no acquaintance with Blair, I knew him by sight. This was the first time I ever spoke to him. The breaking up of Camp Jackson had a good effect and a bad effect. It offended many Union Democrats, who saw an invasion of State rights, which,” said the General, with a smile, “it certainly was. It was used as a means of exciting discontent among these well-disposed citizens, as an argument that the government was high-handed. Then the fact that Germans were used to coerce Americans – free Americans in their own camp, called out by the Governor of the state – gave offense. I knew many good people, with the North, at the outset, whose opinions were set Southward by this incident. But no really loyal man, to whom the Union was paramount, ever questioned the act. Those who went off on this would soon have gone on something else – emancipation or the use of troops. The taking of the camp saved St. Louis to us, saved our side a long, terrible siege, and was one of the best things in the whole war. I remember how rejoiced I was as I saw Blair and Lyon bring their prisoners into town.”

    

03/16/11

Was (Is) Missouri a Confederate State?

     Last week I gave a talk on B. Gratz Brown and antebellum Missouri politics to the Kirkwood Historical Society. Afterwards, one gentleman chided me for not telling everyone that Missouri was a Confederate state. I’ve been thinking about this since then. My talk was focused on the events prior to the war, so it wasn’t really relevant, but the real question is: Was Missouri a Confederate state? Well, I suppose it depends on who you ask. You can read the answer of the Price Camp of the Missouri Sons of Confederate Veterans at their website here.  

Claiborne Fox Jackson

    In an earlier post I wrote about the election of February 18, 1861 in which Missouri voters elected delegates to a convention that was to decide whether or not Missouri should secede. Newly-elected Governor Claiborne Fox Jackson had called for the convention in the hope that it would result in Missouri’s secession, as conventions held in other slave states already had. Jackson’s secessionist maneuver was thwarted however, when Missourians overwhelmingly voted for Unionist delegates. When the convention met on February 28 in Jefferson City, and then again on March 4 at the Mercantile Library in St. Louis, the delegates voted 99-1 against secession. (It is interesting to note that even a proposal that would have declared Missouri’s opposition to the Crittenden Compromise and a promise of solidarity with Southern slave states was defeated 70-23. And, for those who like to say that it was the Camp Jackson affair that swayed Sterling Price from the Union, it is perhaps significant that he voted for this proposal. It is obvious that his Unionism was always quite conditional.)

     Before the convention adjourned it appointed a seven member committee that had the authority to call the convention back into session in the event of an emergency. This is exactly what happened later in July, after Federal forces caused Governor Jackson to evacuate Jefferson City.  It is important to remember that the legislature had given the convention legal authority to “consider the then existing relations between the Government of the United States, the people and the governments of the different states and the government and the people of the State of Missouri; and to adopt such measures for vindicating the sovereignty of the state and the protection of its institutions as shall appear to them to be demanded.” When the convention reconvened it avowed that this original charge by the legislature had authorized the convention to amend the state constitution and provide for the replacement of “abandoned” state offices and seats in the legislature. Jackson’s scheming for secession had definitely backfired.

     It is often contended that Nathaniel Lyon or the Federal government (see the SCV website) set up the new provisional government for Missouri. This is not true. The convention was made up of the same Missourians who had been elected by the people of Missouri, with the exception of the minority of delegates, like Sterling Price, who had gone off to side with the Confederates. There were no representatives from Washington and the convention did not do its work at the point of any Federal bayonets.

     In October 1861, Claiborne Jackson called together the exiled legislators in Neosho at which time they passed an ordinance of secession. This act was recognized as legitimate by the Confederate States of America and a star was added to the Confederate flag. For some years it was argued that because they did not have a quorum, the secession ordinance was not valid. More recently evidence surfaced that there was indeed a quorum. Quite frankly, I don’t think it matters. First, one would have to make the case that secession was legal in the first place. The Confederacy was never recognized as a legitimate government. Second, the convention had already vacated the offices these men claimed to hold, and as noted, the convention held legal authority over the state government. Again, if you read the SCV website I linked to, they argue that the convention did not say anything about the quorum issue. I’m not sure what they are referring to, since the convention had already formed the provisional government before the Neosho meeting.

          It is also argued that Lyon declared war on the state of Missouri. I think this statement is misleading at best. Lyon declared war on secessionists; men who were conspiring to foment armed revolution even before Camp Jackson. The SCV and others love to use the Planter’s House Lyon quote “before I would concede to the State of Missouri for one single instant the right to dictate to my government in any matter.., I would see you… and every man, woman, and child in the State, dead, and buried” almost as much as they use the Lincoln Greeley letter quote about saving the Union without ending slavery. It is seldom mentioned, however, that the meeting at the Planter’s House lasted four hours and that Snead, from whose book the quote comes, also stated that Lyon had a better grasp of the issues than anyone in the room. No doubt, Lyon had a temper, but seriously, as Lyon moved across the state to chase down the fleeing secessionists, how many women and children did he stop to kill? I agree with the assessment of the Planter’s House meeting from this website

     “It seems unlikely that either side had much hope for the meeting, and that it is much more likely that both only agreed to it in hopes of maneuvering the public blame for War onto the shoulders of the other. Jackson and Price certainly would have liked to have bought more time for the Missouri State Guard to organize, but one of Lyon’s rock-ribbed demands was the immediate dispersion of the Guard. It is highly unlikely that any agreement that could have been reached would have lasted for more than a month or two, if that long.”

     Ultimately, 110,000 Missourians served in the Union Army, while only 30,000 served the Confederacy (and even that number is suspect). The Jackson government was in exile throughout the war, even though Missouri had voting rights in the Confederate government. Despite tremendous guerilla warfare, Missouri stayed under Union control. A study done by the Department of the Interior in 1934, argued that widespread “deeply rooted” Union sentiment in the state saved Missouri for the Union.

      Finally, where does all this leave these folks who believe Missouri is still a Confederate state “occupied” by a foreign enemy? (I won’t even attempt to cover all the atrocious history there.)

Recommended reading: Louis S. Gerteis, Civil War St. Louis (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2001).